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Introduction
The reasoning of this chapter  may be summarized  as  three  key points.
First,  gains from more open agricultural  trade are  in  large part  public
goods.  Both reductions in export subsidies and the harmonization  of
standards  may be thought of as public goods.  Benefits  are widely
distributed while costs are narrowly concentrated  on noncompetitive
sectors, leading  to incentive problems  which  pose fundamental  challenges
to trade negotiators.  These difficulties  will continually  confront  the trade
reform  process, emphasizing  the political and economic effort  that must
be expended  to overcome  interest groups  threatened  by the process  of
liberalization.
Second,  the negotiating  position of the United  States  in the  GATT  is less
powerful today than in the past, especially  in relation  to  the European
Community  (EC).  However, the United  States  remains
disproportionately  influential  as  a source of trade policy  reform,  in  part
because  the "marginal productivity" of its own actions  continues  to loom
large in the negotiating  process.  Nonetheless,  unilateral trade  policy
reform  is far less  likely  to succeed  than  coordinated  efforts  inside  (and
outside)  of GATT.
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encoded  in the GATT treaty itself.  The  theory of reciprocity  outlined
below emphasizes  that such rules of obligation  can provide  the basis  for
trade liberalization,  if the assurance  exists that  the effort will be jointly
pursued by  a "critical mass"  of members of the  GATT.  The theory of
reciprocity predicts that the lower  the level of support  for trade
liberalization and its harmonization that  is signaled by the United  States,
the less likely other countries are to pursue  similar strategies.  Even with
a critical  mass of countries  favoring such liberalization, the  heterogeneity
of country interests  will make the process  exceedingly  difficult.
Liberalizing agricultural trade  and harmonizing  national  environmental
regulations  are economic,  political,  and legal problems.  Economists
emphasize  efficiency gains  and losses from trade;  political  scientists
examine  the interest group  pressures and  power structures  affecting trade
regimes;  legal analysts  focus on rules under which  different  national  trade
regimes  can be brought into harmony.
This  chapter attempts a  partial synthesis  of these perspectives  by
describing  international  agricultural  trade and environmental  policy
harmonization  as a  "public good problem."  Public goods  are shared  by a
group without direct rivalry  and without  the exclusion  of those whose
benefits  are not matched  by proportionate  contributions  (Samuelson,
1954,  1955).  Public goods form an intersection  of economic,  political,
and legal scholarship,  because  they  involve incentives  to "free ride" which
are directly related to interest group pressures  and lead to different
national regulatory regimes  that are often  in conflict and disharmony
(Olson,  1965).
There are at least three senses  in which  public goods problems  arise  in
international agricultural  trade relations.  First, trading  regimes and rules
of international  commerce are conventions  of behavior which  in
themselves  are public goods  (Kindleberger,  1986; Koester,  1986;  Silk,
1987).  Second,  the  stability which  these rules provide  is  widely
distributed, leading  to  generalized  benefits  in the form of more  stable
market prices  (McCalla  and Josling,  1985, p. 203).  Third,  gains  from
trade  themselves  may be public benefits  (ex ante)  even  if their
distribution  is ultimately  a matter of rivalry  (McCalla  and Josling,  1985,  p.
204).  Although not a  "pure" public good  in the sense used by  economists,
free and open international  markets  generate  an  economic surplus  that is
shared by all market participants  (World Bank,  1987).  These  "gains from
trade" are public benefits  (ex ante)  even if their distribution  is ultimately
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shared, its costs tend to fall more narrowly on those  groups that are
uncompetitive.  When countries  retain the general  benefits  of open  trade
while  attempting to protect  certain sectors  from competition, they  are
"free riding," drawing  down the  global benefits  which  trade provides.
Recent research  on the provision  of public goods lends  insight into  the
problem of opening trade in the face of protectionist  pressures.
This  chapter focuses  on several specific  forms of these protectionist
pressures:  the  use of agricultural  export subsidies  and the use  of health,
safety, and  environmental  regulations  as nontariff trade barriers.  Export
subsidies  have been at the heart of the Uruguay Round  discussion.  There
is  also growing  evidence  that in the years following the Uruguay  Round
much  of the disharmony in national  trade  policies, especially  in
agriculture,  will focus  on "sanitary and phytosanitary  measures."  These
measures  may be described  less  technically  as environmental,  health,  and
safety regulations  (EHS  regulations).
In the face  of these pressures,  GATT has  given  specific attention to both
export  subsidies  and EHS  regulations  in the Uruguay Round.  If export
subsidies  can be disciplined  and "sanitary and phytosanitary"  measures
harmonized,  these would  prevent  a large  share of abuses currently  in
practice.  If such action  leads  to lowering  export  subsidies and preventing
nontariff EHS protection  (or at least requiring  that compensation  be paid
to damaged  parties),  the Uruguay Round  might be judged  a success.
This chapter  is divided into three  parts.  First,  I present the intuition
behind  thinking of trade  disharmony  as  a  "public goods  problem."
Second,  I present a model  drawn from the public goods  literature and
discuss  it in the  context of the "assurance problem" (Sen,  1967; Runge,
1981,  1984).  Third, I apply  insights  from the model to  the problem of
reducing export  subsidies  and harmonizing  EHS regulations  in the years
ahead.
Gains from  Trade as a Public  Good
In economic  theory,  the most powerful  argument  for more open  trade  is
that it yields  efficiency  gains, such that the  demands  of more agents  are
satisfied at higher  levels than  would occur  in  its  absence.  The first
fundamental  theorem of welfare  economics  holds  that in  the absence  of
constraints on trade, the allocation  of goods  in a  competitive  equilibrium
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those disadvantaged  by trade can be compensated  out of the resulting
gains.  The existence of public goods  and other "externalities" upsets  the
fundamental theorems  of welfare  economics,  making efficiency and
compensation  difficult to separate  in practice  (Stiglitz,  1985).
Critics  of more open trade  question the relevance  of Pareto-efficiency  and
have emphasized  that such trade is not necessarily  "fair" (Hudec,  1990).
"Fair trade," in addition to being an appealing  (though ambiguous)
political argument,  is also  a concern of some theorists, who  note that
even a Pareto-efficient  allocation  is entirely compatible with one  person
(or country) getting everything,  and everyone else getting  nothing  (Sen,
1983).  In reality,  the debate  over U.S. trade policy  revolves  around  not
only the efficiency,  but also the fairness,  of various  alternatives  (Rausser,
1982; Runge and von Witzke,  1987).
For  these reasons, the treatment of trade policy reform  as  an
international  public goods problem  raises the same issues that seem most
prominent in policy debates.  Public  goods pose  problems  of both
efficiency and fairness.  They are difficult to  efficiently  supply because  of
the "free rider" problem.  Their supply is also related  to fairness, because
few are willing to contribute more than a  "fair share," based  on some
prior understanding about what a fair contribution  is  (Marwell  and Ames,
1979;  1980;  1981).  An open trading system  is continually  confronted  by
countries  that enjoy  its benefits while overtly or surreptitiously protecting
certain  sectors.  This  form of free riding offends  other countries'  sense of
fairness, leading  to retaliation.  Both  protection and  retaliation  reduce  the
gains from trade,  leaving  all countries worse  off.  Indeed,  one can show
that the gains  from trade can be completely  eroded  by retaliatory
distortions in domestic  policy (Schmitz  and others,  1986).
Recent research points to  the constructive role which  obligations to
institutional  rules can play in  the efficient  provision  of public goods.  The
relationship  between  rules and public goods makes  this research  relevant
to the impact  of GATT on trade liberalization.  The key  feature of such
rules  is that  they provide  a  well-defined  structure of obligation  and
liability.  When  these rules  are broadly  perceived  to be  fair,  they make
claims of benefit  and cost more  secure.  This security,  or assurance,  can
result  in successful collective  agreements  leading  to public  goods
provision,  even if total  (Pareto-efficient)  levels  of public goods are not
achieved  (Runge,  1984).
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although in general  underprovision  equilibria prevail.  In Sugden's  model,
the propensity to free ride can be overcome  by a set of reciprocal
obligations  in which  each  member  of a group contributes  to the public
good, conditional  on the assurance  that others  will do the same.  The
result turns crucially  on the resolution of this  "assurance problem"  (Sen,
1967).  Sugden  (1984,  p. 781)  emphasizes,  that  a structure  of reciprocal
obligation, encoded  in institutional  rules of behavior,  can  provide public
goods  at a Pareto-efficient  level only if the rules  act to assure  the group
that its members  are contributing their "fair shares."  This  approach  does
not predict  that the free rider  problem will be  solved,  only that  it can,
depending on the level of reciprocal  obligation,  and  the assurance  that
these obligations  will be kept.  Without sufficient  assurance,  any group
can be trapped  in an underprovision  equilibrium  in which everyone  would
contribute more if only others would  too, but in which  no one will make
the  first move.
The  international  trading system  is in large part founded  on a similar
form  of assurance.  If countries  fail to commit  domestic resources  to
reduce protectionism,  and instead seek  a free ride by benefiting  from the
trading system while protecting  themselves from  its  costs,  the structure of
reciprocity will  unravel toward  protectionism.  Higher  levels  of
protectionism  thus constitute  greater  and greater  "free riding."  To  hold
the line against demands  for protection  (especially  domestic demands  for
"fair trade"),  countries  must be assured that other  trading  nations will  not
impose new barriers  of their own.  This structure  of mutual  obligation  is
encoded  in the first and most basic principle  of the GATT:
nondiscrimination  and reciprocity, expressed  in the most favored  nation
(MFN)  clause.  Reducing export  subsidies in agriculture  is one form  of
contributing to  the public good of global  trade liberalization.  The
harmonization  of EHS standards  is a further example  of attempts  to
coordinate  economic policies  to  prevent  their use  as a form  of nontariff
barrier.
The purpose of GATT  as an institution is to adjudicate  and  coordinate  a
system  of reciprocal  and harmonized  trading  rules.  Like  many other
international  institutions,  GATT  is relatively  weak,  because  countries  are
unwilling to  provide  international  public goods  by surrendering
sovereignty  to  an international  government  or single  hegemonic power
(Kindleberger,  1986).  The role  of the United States  as  a hegemonic
power  after  World  War  II  (which allowed  it to  demand  and  receive the
1955  and other waivers  to agriculture)  has eroded  (Keohane,  1984).  In
the  absence of hegemony, the system  depends  primarily  on coordinating
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"assurance problem" posed by  efforts to liberalize  trade and to harmonize
EHS regulations  is  thus one  in a  larger set of international  coordination
problems  (Snidal,  1985).
This view of international trade  has implications  for both theory  and
policy.  In theory, wherever  public goods are present,  efficiency will not
be achieved  through atomistic competition  alone.  Its achievement'will  be
bound up not only with  fairness but with the  problem of acquiring
information  concerning  the likely behavior of others.  The assurance
problem  arises because  of insufficient  information concerning  the
willingness of others  to honor  an agreement  to contribute  to a public
good.  Theory must thus  explicitly  account for problems  of information
acquisition  and the strategic structure of reciprocal expectations  and
obligations.
At the level of policy,  the approach suggests  that atomistic  pursuit of
national or group  self-interest will  ultimately fail  to provide  international
public goods.  The invisible hand  guiding decisions toward  collectively
rational  outcomes is a  palsied one without explicit efforts  at coordination
provided  by nonmarket institutions  (Stiglitz,  1985).  Where international
governance  is weak  and hegemonic  power by single countries  is
insufficient to provide order,  efforts at collective  coordination  will rise in
importance  (Snidal,  1985).  This approach leads  to calls for strengthening
international  institutions  such  as the GATT.  It predicts  that policies
favoring protectionist  free riding or unrealizable  hegemony will reduce
the level of obligation  felt to the international  trading system  as  a whole.
Agricultural Trade, Reciprocity,  and the Assurance  Problem
Any  country's  policies  have some effects  on other  countries.'
Macroeconomic  policies  of economic expansion  or contraction  in  one
country, for example, may  lead to  costs for other countries.  Stimulative
monetary  policy under flexible  exchange  rates  may  cause a country  to
1 The  fundamental insight  of modern economics  is that market  trading leads to  positive
effects that are greater than  in the absence  of such trade.  This  gain  from trade is a
"pecuniary  externality" (Scitovsky,  1954)  which,  if widely  shared,  is  a  form  of public  good.
When large  numbers of agents share a  positive  externality,  it is  a  public good  (Mishan,  1971,
pp. 9-13).
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reductions  in domestic unemployment  at the expense  of increases  in
domestic inflation.  But if all (or a sufficiently large)  number  of countries
pursue such a policy, none can succeed,  because  exchange  rates cannot
fall for everyone.  Expansionary  monetary policies  then  result in much
higher overall inflation  than expected,  due to a failure  to anticipate that
other countries  will follow suit.  Instead  of increasing export  trade
through a lower exchange rate,  such policies  may only "export inflation"
(Hamada,  1976).
In agriculture,  U.S.- and European-subsidized  exports have  led to similar
problems due to  a failure to account for the strategic interdependence  of
such policies.  As both the United States and EC have  subsidized  these
export sales in a cycle of retaliation, they have contributed  to decreasing
prices  for world trading nations as a whole.  In  the case of EHS
regulations,  failure to  agree on standards  for hormone treatments  of beef
have triggered  a similar,  though smaller,  cycle  of retaliation.
Exchange  rates, export subsidies, and EHS regulations  are all instances  in
which there are coordinated  solutions that would  leave all countries
better  off.  However,  such coordination  generally  means that existing
institutions  must be modified  or a  new institutional  framework  invented,
so that countries are assured that their actions will be coordinated  to
mutual advantage.2  In the GATT case,  two primary  changes  in the
institutional arrangement  contemplated  during the Uruguay Round  have
been greater  inclusion  of export subsidies  and  EHS regulations  under
GATT rules.
2  Kehoe (1986a,  b) demonstrates  in a dynamic optimal  taxation  model that fiscal  policy
coordination may be inoptimal due to a lack  of binding commitments  by government  not to
tax  capital too highly.  The problem  is a  lack of assurance  by consumers  that taxes on capital
will not be raised once an agreement  between countries  has been  struck.  This  assurance
problem prevents  coordination  from  being a superior solution.  An  institution to maintain
this assurance  is lacking.
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strategies  0  and 1, is shown below  in normal form.
Country B
0  1
0  (4, 3)  (2, 2)
Country A
1  (1,  1) (3,  4)
Trade strategies coordinated  along the diagonal  lead  to outcomes  that are
Pareto-optimal  (Sen,  1969).  Despite the optimality of the solutions  in
which trade policy coordination occurs,  one cooperative  solution  (0,  0) is
better for Country A, and one (1,  1) is better for country B. 3  However,
both equilibriums are better than the off-diagonal,  uncoordinated
strategies.  Note that policy coordination does not necessarily  imply that
countries  A and  B pursue the same  policy,  only  that their trade  strategies
are coordinated with  one another.
The problem is that neither country  can  choose  its best policy without
some assurance  concerning  what  the other intends  to do  (Snidal,  1985,
pp.  931-34).  Easy resolution  is hindered  by the  inherently  opposed
country interests  over where  coordination  should occur.  Unlike  the  more
familiar  prisoners'  dilemma  (PD) game,  the problem  in  this  case is one  of
a  choice over  multiple stable  equilibriums.  In the  PD,  the  problem  is to
3 Schelling  (1960)  describes  such a problem  in terms  of Holmes  and  Moriarty,  each
aboard  separate  trains,  neither  in touch with  one another, attempting  to  coordinate  the  point
at which  they  might detrain.  Both  benefit from  getting off at the same  station,  with Holmes
benefiting  most if they detrain  together at (0, 0)  and Moriarty  benefiting  most if they detrain
together at (1, 1).
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negotiations,  however,  involve nondiscrete choices that  are not "all or
nothing" and which are affected by considerations  of both bargaining
power and fairness.
Solving this problem of strategy  requires a form of strategic commitment,
in which Country A commits  to a  cooperative solution conditional  on  its
expectation that Country B will do likewise.  This conditional
commitment can be rationally self-interested  where reinforced  by
strengthened  rules of international  trade.  To  provide  a formal basis for
this reciprocal  obligation,  we consider  the role of GATT as a solution  to
the assurance  problem in the context  of what  Sugden has  called
"reciprocity theory."
The theory of reciprocity  (Sugden,  1984)  argues that agents  can supply
themselves  with public goods  through conditional  commitments.  Such
commitments  do not stipulate that a group  member always  contributes to
a public good.  These commitments say only that if others in a well-
defined group are contributing,  then a group member is  obliged to do the
same.  Well-defined  obligations  exist  to a group  to which one belongs  and
from which one derives  benefits.  These groups may be local, national,  or
international, including  signatories of international  trade agreements.
Individual  contracting parties  to GATT,  for example,  have well-defined
obligations  to maintain  an open international  trading system.
4  If CA represents  the strategy of country A and  C
B  that of country  B, for two strategies
0 and 1, the prisoners'  dilemma ordering is:
CA  (0, 1)  >CA  (1,  1)  >  CA  (0, 0)  >  CA (1,  0)
CR  (1,  0)  > C
B (1, 1)  >  C" (0,  0)  >  CB  (0,  1)
The equilibrium  (0, 0) is a single,  stable, and Pareto-inferior  equilibrium.  In contrast,  the
assurance problem  takes the general  form:
CA  (0, 0)  >  CA (1,1) >  CA (0,  1) =  CA  (1, 0)
C"  (1,  1)  >  C" (0, 0)  >  CB  (1, 0)  =  C" (0,  1)
Here there are multiple equilibriums:  (0, 0) and (1,  1).  In the  special form of  this game  in
which there  is an agreed  best outcome, the ordering  takes the form:
CA (1,1)  > CA  (0,  0)  > CA (0,1)  > CA  (1,  0)
C" (1, 1) >  C  (0, 0)  > C" (1,  0)  >  CB  (0, 1)
While retaining the set of multiple equilibria,  the problem  is now not one of conflict but of
being assured of the other country's action  (Sen,  1969,  pp. 4-5).
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function  of the gains from international  trade measured  by z.  This  trade
creation,  Z, constitutes a public good.  Country welfare  is a decreasing
function  of the resources  (political and economic)  necessary  to overcome
domestic efforts at protection.  These resources,  q;,  are equivalent  to the
domestic effort contributed to maintain an open trading system.  One way
of specifying  q;  is the reduction in net effective  protection  for country  i, in
relation to a predetermined  base period.  Hence:
Wi=  W1(q,  z)  (i =  1, .... n)  (1)
If h1(q,,  z) is the  marginal rate of substitution between  z and  q;,  then by
definition:
h,(q,  z)  =-  (5W/qi)/(5WJ/z)  (i  =  1,  ...  n)  (2)
Two additional restrictions, reasonable  for one good  (gains from trade)
and one bad (efforts  to reduce protection),  are:
6hi(91,  z)/qi >  0  (i =  1 .... n)  (3)
and
Sh 1(q,  z)/S6  >  0  (i  = 1 .... n)  (4)
World  gains from trade are a function of the resources devoted  to
maintaining  an open trading environment  by individual  countries.  These
are contributions  to the  public good.  The  "production function" for z is
thus the weighted  sum of individual  country efforts  to reduce  trade
protection.
n
z = f (Ea Q 1)  (5)
i=1
The  function f(.) is assumed  continuous,  increasing,  and concave  (or
linear in the limit).  The parameter a  (a positive  constant)  is the "weight"
or effect on world gains  from trade of the policies of country  i,  on the
assumption that equal effort  need not be equally productive  for  all
countries.  This assumption opens  the possibility of disproportionate
contributions  by certain  countries  to an open international  trading system.
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reduce  levels of export subsidies,  the effect on total gains  from  trade
would be disproportionately  felt  by the world  trading system.  Now define
a total  contribution function F(.) for a given level  of country efforts  or
contributions  q =  (q,, ... q,)  by a group  G  (signatories  of GATT)  and a
given level  of total effort 7, such that where  7r  0,
F (G,7) = f(E  Car +  E  akqk)  (6)
jEG  kEG
This equation  says that for any group of countries  G, and level  of effort r
S0, F(G, r) is the gain from trade that would result  if every signatory of
GATT had contributed to open trade  by a lower level of protection r and
each  nonmember  k had contributed  q,.  (This function  must  be
continuous,  increasing,  and  concave  in T.)  For the GATT signatories,
given the contributions  of nonsignatories  qk, let  qiG be the value  of r that
maximizes W 1 i[T, F(G,  T)].
If each country i could choose a lowered  level of protection  for all GATT
signatories,  this is the level it would choose.  The  principle of reciprocity
says that GATT signatory  i is obligated  to contribute  qiG,  conditional  on
every other member of G doing  the same.s  If countries  pursue self-
interest subject to  these obligations,  then country i will  make  the smallest
contribution to reduced  levels of protection  that  is compatible with its
obligations  to all groups  of which  it is a; member,  including  the group  G
=  {i}.  Hence,  purely domestic self-interest  is allowed  expression,  since
every country  has an obligation  to itself to contribute  at least  as  much  (or
as little) protection  as self-interest  requires.
The essential features  of this model are that  (a)  equilibrium  exists;  (b) it
is' not necessarily unique;  (c)  one  equilibrium  is Pareto-optimal--the
Samuelsonian one  in which the marginal  rate of substitution  between q;
and z is equal to the marginal rate of transformation;  and  (d)  every other
5 The  following formal  definitions  may  be stated  (Sugden,  1984,  p. 777):
Obligations.  For  any vector of contributions  q,  for any  group G, and  for any
group  member i, i is  meeting its obligation  to  G  if and only if either (a)  q,  >  qi
°
or (b)  for some other agent j in  G, qi  > qj.
Equlllbrium n.  An equilibrium  is a vector  of contributions  q such that for each
country i, given  the contributions of other countries,  q; is the smallest  contribution
that is  compatible with all  of i's obligations.
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Pareto-inefficient  equilibriums  involving underprovision  of the public
good are due in the case of GATT to excessive  levels  of protection  by the
signatories.
If insufficient effort  is expended  to reduce these  levels, the theory
outlined here suggests  the assurance  problem as an important
explanation.  Inefficient  equilibriums are ones in which  every country
would reduce its level of protection  if only they were assured  that others
would do so too  (Sen,  1967;  Runge,  1984).7  This statement  does not
suggest that the problem of protectionism will be  solved--only that  it can
be solved.  In theory, even  in a world of identical  countries,  reciprocal
obligations  can break down  in the face of the assurance  problem.  This
breakdown  is even more  likely where the countries  have widely varying
objectives  (Sugden,  1984, p.  783).
Despite these obstacles,  the reciprocal  obligations  defined  by GAT  can
be an important  basis for more open international  trade and the
harmonization of EHS standards.  One of the important  predictions
generated  by the theory is that if country j's level of protection  is the
same as country i's, an increase in j's will probably  bring about  an
increase in i's, and vice versa.  If the United States, with a comparatively
large  influence (ai) over GATT,  reduces its  level of export  subsidies and
seeks to harmonize  its EHS regulations  with major  trading partners  such
as Canada  and the EC, then the incentive  for others  to take similar
actions will  increase (Paarlberg,  1987).  However,  the overall  success  of
policy coordination will depend  on the assurance that  the effort  is general
and that some countries will not simply free ride by continuing  to
maintain  high levels of protection.
A critical  mass of countries  may be necessary to overcome  the assurance
problem.  Schelling  (1973)  has proposed  a  framework ii  which  the
willingness  of country i to contribute  is described as  a function of the
number of others  that are expected  to do so.  Therefore,  payoff curves  to
country i from contributing  to the reduction  of trade barriers  (C) versus a
6 Sugden proves these  results for the case of homogeneous  agents.  Where agents are
heterogeneous,  the results are  qualitatively  the same, but  the  assurance  problem  is
exacerbated.
'  If the problem were a  prisoners'  dilemma,  then  no country would  reduce  its level  of
protection,  even  if every other country did.  Protectionism would  be a  dominant strategy.
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of the number of other countries  that are expected to  contribute.  Where
the P function  lies above the  C function, protection  is  a  dominant
strategy,  until point y, when  "critical mass"  makes the reduction  of trade
barriers  a dominant  strategy.  The function  of multilateral trade
negotiations  (MTN's)  is precisely  to generate such  a critical mass  by
negotiating  agreements in which  each  country is  assured that a sufficiently
large  number of others will  engage  in coordinated trade reforms.
An important feature of MTN's  is the degree  to which  they  prompt
optimism that other countries will in fact cooperate  to reduce trade
barriers.  While beyond  the scope of this chapter,  "pessimism" over
whether other countries  will  reduce protectionism  is one  measure  of
assurance.  Hurwicz  (1951)  has  proposed an index of pessimism, such  that
the likelihood of a given country  choosing a  protectionist  strategy is a
direct function of a  "pessimism-optimism index."'
8 If each country follows  the pessimism-optimism  index  of Hurwicz  (1951),  a critical pair
of values  (a,  b)  exists  representing the  indexes  of country A  and B,  and contained  in the
open interval  (0,  1),  such that if either country actually has  an  index  above this  value  (is  "too
pessimistic")  then the  outcome  will be Pareto-inferior.  If both countries  have greater than
critical  pessimism,  then the outcome  will be a  Pareto-inferior equilibrium  point, equivalent  to
Sugden's underprovision equilibrium.
Let the index of pessimism  of A and B be  PA and P,  respectively,  and the strategies  be 0 and
1 for  CA  and  CB,  as  in the  modified  assurance problem  (footnote  5)  in which  (1,  1) is  the
agreed  best outcome,  such  as multilateral reductions  in agricultural protection.  Then  country
A will  choose  protectionist strategy 0  if:
PAC  (0,  1)  +  (1-  PA)  CA (0,  0)  >  PAC
A  (1,  0)  +  (1  - PA)  CA  (1,  1)
that is,  if
PA>  [CA  (1,  1)-  CA  (0,  0)]/[CA  (0,  1)  +  CA  (1,  1)-  CA  (0, 0)  -CA  (1,  0)
-a
Similarly,  country  B will  choose  0  if
PB >  [CB  (1,  1)  - CB  (0, 0)]/[CB  (1,  0)  +  CB  (1,  1)  - CB  (0, 0)
-CB  (0,  1)]-  b
If CA  (1,  1)  >  CA  (0,  0)  and  CA  (0,  1)  >  CA  (1,  0)  (see footnote  5),  then
0  <  a  <  1, and  0  <  b  <  1.  If PA  >  a,  or PE  >  b,  the outcome  will be  other than  (1,  1),  the
unique Pareto-optimum.  If both  hold,  the choice will  be  (0, 0),  the  underprovision
(protectionist)  equilibrium  (Sen,  1969,  pp.  5-6).
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encoded  in international  trading rules  such as  GATT provides  a basis for
the coordination  of trade and reduction of protectionism  in world
agriculture.  The principal reason these rules fail is the  assurance
problem,  which  is exacerbated  by the heterogeneity  of interests  and lack
of enforcement  typical of international  public goods.  Despite these
difficulties,  such  rules are capable  of improving  the welfare  of all those
who subscribe  to them,  especially  if a critical  mass  of others is expected
to  do so.
Models  and Reality
Several specific  features of the  above model are worth  emphasis.  Apart
from its characterization  of trade  negotiation  problems  in terms  of a
public goods model, which  provides  a formal  interpretation  of the sort of
obligations  encoded  in the GATT articles,  four specific  features  lend it
some realism in a trade-negotiating  context.  The  first of these  is the
allowance  for differential  "productivity" in the provision  of the public
good.  The  capacity  of the model to show that  certain  GATT  contracting
parties,  such  as the United States  and EC, disproportionately  influence
the general  level  of trade liberalization  provides  a formal  basis  for the
fact that while  all contracting  parties to  GAT  are theoretically equal,
some are more equal than others.  When considering  the possibility  of a
"critical mass"  of countries  required  to provide  a requisite  degree of
assurance  that cooperative trade  liberalization,  rather  than protectionism,
will be the  norm,  one can also  adjust the capacity of any agent  to
"contribute" according  to this differential  productivity  (Schelling,  1973).
In  effect, an agent  can "count" as more than  one in  a set of n  agents  in
terms  of its contribution to  the process  of liberalization  or harmonization
of standards.
Second,  the model accurately  portrays  the difficulties  of achieving
substantial  levels of trade  liberalization,  by  emphasizing  the observation
that  achieving  "full provision" equilibriums  at  Pareto-optimal  levels  is
difficult  for several  reasons.  However,  some provision is likely,
characterized  by equilibriums  in which  the group  G (here  the GATT
contracting  parties)  is partially  but not wholly successful  in  solving the
assurance problem.  This observation  is consistent with  the partial and
incremental  success  of various  GATT  Rounds  in eliminating  or binding
trade-distorting  measures  and harmonizing  various  standards.  Because
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expectations  and  perceived obligations  of the agents,  the provision  of
some  of the public good at whatever  level will reflect  the extent  to which
the assurance problem  has been overcome.  The narrow view that "strong
free riding" will be a  dominant strategy  is thus broadened to  allow for a
continuum of behavior between  zero and full provision;  that is, between
strong free riding and no  free riding at all, depending  on  the expectations,
and thus the perceived obligations,  of the group.9
Third, the model predicts  that larger, more heterogeneous  groups will
find higher levels  of provision more difficult  than  smaller, more
homogeneous  groups.  The assurance  problem  (which is fundamentally a
problem of information  acquisition about the likely behavior of others)
becomes  more difficult to solve when  agents are diffuse  and dissimilar
(Runge,  1984).  The "size of the group" problem in public goods
provision, first emphasized by Olson (1965),  has been  clearly in  evidence
as GATT  has grown from 22  to over  100 contracting  parties.  But size is
only one aspect of the problem of information  acquisition.  Size is
compounded by the increasing heterogeneity  of the parties'  interests.  The
model predicts  that the assurance  problem is more  easily  solved  by
smaller,  more homogeneous  groups, in which the relevant  "n," and thus
the relevant  "critical mass,"  is smaller.  This  prediction  generates  the
corollary  prediction that large  groups such  as GATT's contracting  parties
may break themselves  into smaller, more  homogeneous  units to resolve
difficult issues of trade negotiation.  The  "localization" of public goods,  to
borrow  a phrase from that literature,  is  observed  in  the Uruguay Round
in the form of the  Cairns Group,  the food-importing group  (FIG's),  and
less formal groups  meeting  on a regular  basis in  Geneva  or elsewhere.o
Fourth, careful  examination  of the model suggests that it is not robust  in
the face  of group  members  who  fail  to "do their duty," because  obligations
are defined specifically  in terms of the contribution  levels  of this  "lowest
common denominator."  This problem  (which I refer  to as the "one bad
apple" phenomenon)  may seem  to make the  model  less appropriate  to
9 Recent experiments  (Isaac,  Schmidtz,  and Walker,  1989)  testing the validity  of the
assurance  problem  confirm that  free riding is not  a  dominant  strategy in these  games,
reinforcing  the results  of Marwell  and Ames (1979).
10 These groups  have included,  for example,  the "Morges Group," whose meetings  take
place  in a  small village away from  Geneva, and a weekly  meeting  at the  U.S. Trade
Representative's  offices known  familiarly as  the "Dirty Dozen," a group of high-income
developed  countries.
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evidently tolerated.  From a technical  point of view, the  problem  can be
corrected by respecifying  obligations  in terms of a group  "norm" or
average contribution.  In the GATT  context,  however, the holdout nation
is particularly  acceptable, since under  the GATT articles  any country  may,
in principle,  block a proposed action, lowering  the obligations  of other
parties to those previously  existing obligations.  Thus, a feature which
makes the model appear to  lack robustness  in  fact  accurately describes
the difficulties of multilateral  decisionmaking  in GATT.  Just as this lack
of robustness generates  a search  for a more robust  model of obligations
to the group  G, so GATT has sought to redefine the obligations  of
contracting  parties to avoid the blocking of consensus  by a single country.
Efforts  in the Functioning of the GATT System  (FOGS)  negotiations  to
adopt a "consensus minus two" rule for votes on  panel  disputes, are an
example,  since the presumably aggrieved  parties  would then  be outvoted
by a  majority of n - 2.
In terms of the two specific problems that have  driven this analysis,
export  subsidies  and the harmonization  of EHS  standards,  the model
offers  the following  insights.  First, both reductions  in  export
subsidization  and the harmonization  of EHS standards will  be  advanced  if
"high productivity" contracting  parties  support  it.  The defection  of a
"high productivity" negotiating  party such  as the EC  may,  conversely, be
sufficient to seriously  retard the process.
Second,  the negotiating  process will probably  not lead  to an equilibrium
in which no progress is  made, just as  complete trade  reform will probably
not be accomplished.  By strategically  asserting  high  goals  (as  the United
States has  done), the expected  level of obligation  to trade  policy  reform
can be raised,  in this sense "moving" the equilibrium  toward  a
"prominent" solution, such  as a 50-percent  reduction  in export subsidies
(Crawford  and Haller,  1990).  The degree  of success  ultimately turns  on
the extent  to which the  assurance  problem is overcome.
Third, the increasing size  and heterogeneity  of GATT' does not bode well
for rapid trade  policy reform.  Divisions between  the First and  Third
Worlds, evident  in many  areas of the  Uruguay Round, are likely  to be
compounded  by entry to  GATT' of Second World  countries such  as the
former  Soviet Union and China.  This problem  is especially true in  the
case of the harmonization  of EHS standards, due to  the different  views  of
states on the relative priority  of health,  safety, and the environment
compared with food  and agricultural  production  (Runge,  1990).
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refusing to  cooperate, exemplified  by  the EC in  the Uruguay Round  are
capable of lowering the global  sense of obligation  to trade policy  reform,
whether the issue is  export subsidies,  EHS harmonization,  or something
else.  The apparent decision  of the EC to play the role of "bad apple,"  if
the model described has  predictive value, will  have serious long-term
effects by encouraging  (or at least not discouraging)  global  protectionism
by others.  The prediction  is clear:  Free riding  begets free riding, just as
liberalization  begets  liberalization.  In this global  game of tit-for-tat,  a
recurrent pattern of retaliatory  protectionism  may  lead to an equilibrium
in world trade that  is very  low indeed.
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